I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app.
I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.
Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
(I’m a regular donator, in case this is a subtle dig to put my money where my mouth is, but yes - everyone who finds real value in it should support them.)
Spammers operate out of countries where they have no fear of legal consequences, so all Signal has to do to deter them from the crypto option is make it more expensive than bulk phone numbers are.
It still costs money. I don't see why money in a different form would cause more spam. If it did, they could raise the price if they're getting more spam.
I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.
Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.
The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
If you want real security and anonymity, with support for multiple and temporary identities, use SimpleX. Recommended by Whonix, which is recommended by Edward Snowden.
No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.
If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.
Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
I will stick with services that can be my dumb pipe and use E2EE libraries that can do MLS [1], OMEMO [2], OTR [3], GPG [4] and manage keys out of band but I do appreciate that services like signal exist to limit the number of governments that can eavesdrop.
And how many of the people you chat with daily use all those? Your friends, relatives, elementary school classmates, high school friends who still call you over for a beer (and you them), coworkers from previous projects with new leads etc.?
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
It turns out that good privacy tech doesn't rely on jurisdictions.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
"Moxie Marlinspike" I am not going to trust some jabroni, straight out of central casting, who doesn't even fly by his family name. Seems like yet another usgov+hollywood fabrication. Good on you.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
I built Groups, starting nearly a decade years ago, as a privacy-preserving CRM. Since then it’s been downloaded by about 6 million people in over 100 countries. It isn’t as big as Signal by any means, but it has an entirely different focus. You can download it and try it — it’s free:
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
> This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.
I have family conversation in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.
This outlook is initially appealing. The problem with it is that it is not only your choice that matters, it is also the choice of your contacts. Do your contacts want you to share their private conversations with you with online AI, unencrypted? Do you want your private conversations to be leaked by your contacts?
I'd imagine stuff like this is why, say, Telegram has a difference between "non-secret" and "secret" chats. I'd imagine all Signal would need is a similar mechanism for either locking down an existing chat or making a new locked-down chat. Then you could be confident that none of its participants could be passing it to a leaky or unscrupulous provider.
Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.
Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
https://signal.org/donate/
I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.
Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.
The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
Signal is for pretend-security.
No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.
If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.
Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
Can we please stop it with this?
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security
[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO
[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...
[4] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
[0]: https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/
https://groups.app/confidential.html
https://qbix.com/GROUPS
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
I have family conversation in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.
Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.
How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?
Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?
This is a very unfocused team.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)