This attack seems predicated on a prior security incident (https://socket.dev/blog/unauthorized-ai-agent-execution-code...) at Trivy where they failed to successfully remediate and contain the damage. I think at this time, Trivy should’ve undertaken a full reassessment of risks and clearly isolated credentials and reduced risk systemically. This did not happen, and the second compromise occurred.
Some of them were likely already compromised before these incidents, here's one of the accounts near the top making malicious commits to its own repository before the first hack:
"Briefly" is doing a lot of work there. Pre-deploy scans are useless once a bad mutation is actually live. If you don't have a way to auto-revert the infrastructure state instantly, you're just watching the fire spread.
I only clicked on a handful of accounts but several of them have plausibly real looking profiles.
https://github.com/Hancie123/mero_hostel_backend/commit/4bcb...
There are hundreds of automated spam comments there from presumably compromised accounts. The new OP is much more clear regarding what has happened.
"Trivy Supply Chain Attack Spreads, Triggers Self-Spreading CanisterWorm Across 47 npm Packages"
https://it.slashdot.org/story/26/03/22/0039257/trivy-supply-...